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Christos Memos 
Abertay University, Dundee 
The Concept of ‘Crisis’ in the Thought of Cornelius Castoriadis 
‘The history of a text’, according to Karel Kosik, ‘is the history of its interpretations’ and 
‘every interpretation of a text is always also its evaluation’. (Kosik 1976: 94, 95) This in 
turn, implies that every interpretation-evaluation accentuates distinct features of the text 
or the scholar under examination, thus disclosing and accrediting discrete meanings to 
them. More significantly, this process of understanding an author and comprehending her 
texts by concentrating on concrete aspects of her work has considerable theoretical and 
political implications. No doubt, the above could be applied with equal force to the texts 
and the whole body of Cornelius Castoriadis’s work. The growing recognition of his 
thought and the attractiveness of his writings are almost exclusively associated and in 
many cases totally identified with some of his later philosophical writings. This part of 
his theorising was assigned a merit that tends not only to overshadow the totality of his 
theoretical production. It has also been taken the form of a closed system, which through 
a process of ruthless canonisation has established a ‘paradigm’ of what constitutes the 
essence and most fundamental elements, the crux of Castoriadis’s thought. By focusing 
entirely upon some of his later philosophical texts, most of Castoriadis’s commentators 
have consciously or unconsciously produced and re-produced a particular interpretation 
of his thought, which turns out to be misleading and obscure. This procedure was backed 
up by an ongoing evocation and application of a selective philosophical terminology. By 
omitting almost entirely Castoriadis’s political and social writings, Castoriadis’s thought 
has been classified on the basis of a firm and peculiar vocabulary whose familiarity and 
constant usage constitutes an absolute pre-supposition for a first encounter or a more 
systematic engagement with Castoriadis. The construction of Castoriadis’s ‘jargon’, 
including concepts such as ‘imagination’, ‘imaginary significations’, ‘chaos’, ‘creation’, 
‘monad’, ‘psyche’, ‘magma’, ‘ensemblistic-identitary logic’, ‘legein and teukhein’, 
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‘Anlehnung’,  reinforces an one-sided interpretation of his thought that abstracts from 
real historical and social factors.  
 
This kind of philosophical analysis omits almost entirely the social and political content 
of his writings and channels his thought into de-politicisation, thus establishing a 
preconceived norm, which could be easily accommodated and led into a conformist 
direction. It departs from the complex and multifaceted character of his analysis and 
conceals Castoriadis’s political commitments. Such approaches have moved away from 
Castoriadis’s radicalism and tend to neglect the anti-capitalist elements of his thought or 
to treat them as obsolete and by extension to nullify Castoriadis’s ‘political, praxical, 
revolutionary perspective’. (Castoriadis 1993a: 276) In contrast to these commentators, 
Castoriadis was adamant that he was first and foremost a political thinker. I his own 
words: ‘I have never considered myself to be only a philosopher but always someone 
who wants to do philosophy and politics at the same time…This persistence, this 
adherence to the political project, distinguishes me considerably from everything that is 
being written today’. (Castoriadis 1995: 31) Castoriadis’s project of social emancipation 
amounted not only to critical understanding of the existing capitalist social relations, but, 
most importantly, to a constant struggle of changing and radically transforming them.1 
Viewed this way, it can be said that Castoriadis`s later philosophical writings should be 
read and construed through the lens of his political and social writings and not vice versa.   
 
Spelling out the implications of this perspective, then, this interpretation challenges other 
prevalent strands of commentary on Castoriadis which comprehend his thought by 
putting an exclusive accent on a specific part of his later philosophical writings, thus 
creating a self-sufficient space of meaning embellished with a Castoriadian jargon. In a 
like manner, it rejects those accounts which perceive Castoriadis’s critique of Marx and 
Marxism as being part of the post-modernist tradition that rebuffs grand narratives and 
advocates western forms of liberal and representative democracy. Instead and in 
accordance with Castoriadis` own commitment, his work is placed in a critical dialogue 
with Marx and Critical Theory.2 In this sense, the argument of this chapter is that the 
concept of ‘crisis’ constitutes a core problematic of Castoriadis’s theorizing. 
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Castoriadis`s theory of crisis reflects his intellectual development and connects the 
several stages of his evolution.  It does not deny Castoriadis`s intellectual development, 
but it portrays the continuities and discontinuities, turns and new beginnings, ruptures and 
contradictions of his thought. The concept of crisis remained a focal point in the thinking 
of Castoriadis through his critical confrontation with both the crisis of Marxism and 
traditional Leftist theory and practice and the crisis of modern capitalist societies. This 
chapter focuses on Castoriadis`s critical and topical engagement with the crisis of the 
latter and stresses its relevance for contemporary critical theory. First, it examines 
Castoriadis`s correlation of the crisis of modern societies with the concept of reification 
and the impact of class struggles. Crisis is discussed here as being inherent to the 
contradictory and antagonistic constitution of the capitalist social relations and 
Castoriadis is situated in a critical dialogue with Lukács and Adorno. Second, the chapter 
goes on to critically explore Castoriadis`s subsequent view of the crisis as a phenomenon 
ensuing from the conflict between the social imaginary significations of ‘autonomy’ and 
the unlimited expansion of ‘rational mastery’, which has led to the eclipse of the project 
of autonomy. Finally, it engages with Castoriadis`s argument that modern societies are 
moving from a state of permanent crisis to a situation of decline and decomposition, 
manifested in the rising tide of insignificancy and new forms of barbarism. 
 
Castoriadis, Lukács, Adorno: Crisis and Reification as a Dynamic Concept 
The theme of ‘crisis’ is central to Castoriadis`s writing and runs throughout his work 
from his very early years in France. The importance of his analysis lies in the importance 
that the concept of reification has in his exposition of his theory of crisis. He conceived 
of the recurring crises of modernity as a phenomenon inherent in capitalist social 
relations, which is correlated with the process of reification and the people`s militant 
opposition to their ongoing and pervasive thingification. Against the background of the 
Second World War tragic experience, as well as the post-war socioeconomic 
developments in both USA and USSR, Castoriadis was led to question the traditional 
Marxist approaches on the issue of crisis. This was the corollary of his critical attitude 
towards Marx and his gradual rupture with classical Marxism, although during his early 
period in France, which runs roughly from 1945 until the late 1960s, he remains within 
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Marx`s and critical Marxism`s theoretical framework. Castoriadis views the category of 
reification as the ‘most important aspect of Marx`s doctrine’ (Castoriadis 1993b: 54), 
which Lukács had elaborated further in his History and Class Consciousness. One of 
Castoriadis`s basic assumptions was his point that both Western and East European 
regimes are marked by common tendencies, which encompassed the merging of state and 
economy, the concentration of capital and the bureaucratization of societies. On an 
international scale, the bureaucracy emerged as a new social stratum and substituted the 
traditional bourgeoisie. In this line of thought, he opined that all these global 
developments and trends were likely to lead the two systems—the American and the 
Russian—to a convergence. Within this world context, society is not any more ruled by 
the traditional function of capital or the abstract forces of the market, but it is dominated 
by a ‘hierarchical bureaucratic structure’. (Castoriadis 1993b: 31) On this criterion, 
Castoriadis challenged the classical Marxists views by arguing that the fundamental 
contradiction inherent in capitalist society shifted from the division between capital and 
labour to the split and conflict between direction and execution. 
 
Castoriadis`s direct engagement with what he considered to be as the Marxist 
problematic with regard to the concept of reification led him to criticize Marx`s usage 
of the term. For Castoriadis, Marx placed too much emphasis on the study and 
discovery of the scientific economic laws that govern capitalist societies at the expense 
of the action of social classes. An important aspect of Castoriadis`s critique concerns 
Marx’s theory of fetishism, which is viewed as an ‘abstraction that corresponds […] 
with only half of reality, and as such it is ultimately false’. (Castoriadis, 2005: 16) 
Following Castoriadis`s view, reification cannot be complete and the workers in 
capitalism are by no means fully reified and entirely alienated. In addition to being a 
touchstone for his analysis, Castoriadis further elaborated the notion of reification by 
perceiving it as a dynamic concept, in a manner that resembles Adorno`s corresponding 
treatment of the notion under discussion. Castoriadis deploys his conception of the 
relationship between reification and crisis by focusing on the appearance of crisis in 
post-war modern societies. Firstly, the crisis is displayed in the collective practical 
activity of the people who struggle against their reduction to objectified commodities. 
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Revolts, rallies, protests of any kind, strikes, sit-ins and everyday militancy and 
resistance challenge the ubiquitous dominance of reification and the mechanisms which 
produce and reproduce it. The Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the French May of 1968 
constitute key examples of people`s struggle against reification. Secondly, crisis is 
demonstrated as depoliticization, privatization, apathy, nonparticipation and 
unresponsiveness to social and political issues. Such instances of detachment can be 
seen as symptomatic expressions of an invisible fighting against the thingified reality or 
the depersonalisation and dehumanization of individuals in capitalist bureaucratic 
societies. Viewed this way, as Castoriadis noted, ‘in both cases, beyond a certain point 
this conflict leads to the overt crisis of the established society’. (Castoriadis 1988a: 
155-156) These two expressions of crisis run through the whole body of Castoriadis`s 
theorizing and indicate the underlying continuity between his early and later writings. 
 
As far as the first approach is concerned, Castoriadis’s theory of crisis grants a central 
role to the dynamic of class struggle and the working class organised protest as the 
factors which spark off the crises of the capitalist system. As he argues the capitalist 
crises are the ‘by-product of struggle’. (Castoriadis 1993c: 115) Opposed to any 
deterministic and objective interpretations of crisis ensuing from the abstract and natural 
laws of capitalist economy, crisis is viewed by Castoriadis as a social category. Crises are 
inherent to capitalist social relations and occur due to a systemic fundamental 
contradiction. If for Lukács the ‘structure of a crisis is seen to be no more than a 
heightening of the degree and intensity of the daily life of bourgeois society’ (Lukács 
1971: 101), for Castoriadis crises are founded on the intensified conflict between 
directors and executants in the sphere of work and production. Crisis as a social 
phenomenon, as a category of social contradiction, is inherent in the theory of reification, 
within the conditions of alienation experienced by workers in their everyday life under 
the capitalist organisation of social relations. In contrast to Lukács account, the notion of 
reification that informs Castoriadis`s theorising of crisis emphasises his view of crisis as 
non-static and non-rigid. It rather should be understood as a contradictory, fluid and 
dynamic concept that mirrors the conflicting and antagonistic relationship between 
directors and executants. 
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According to Horkheimer, ‘tension characterizes all the concepts of the critical way of 
thinking […] the critical acceptance of the categories which rule social life contains 
simultaneously their condemnation’. (Horkheimer 1972: 208) Following this line of 
thought, Castoriadis does not view reification as a fixed concept or as a hypostatised 
moment. He develops a processual and dialectical understanding of the notion of 
reification, which is rooted unequivocally and explicitly in people`s life process and in 
workers` experience. For Lukács the advance of the capitalist organization of society is 
constantly proceeding at higher levels of development and ‘the structure of reification 
progressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully and more definitely into the 
consciousness of man’ (Lukács 1971: 93). Stating the point differently, Lukács argued 
that ‘the transformation of the commodity relation into a thing of “ghostly objectivity” ’ 
is not limited to an entire commodification of human life, but most importantly ‘it stamps 
its imprint upon the whole consciousness of man’ (Lukács 1971: 100) and ‘this 
rationalization of the world appears to be complete, it seems to penetrate the very depths 
of man`s physical and psychic nature’. (Lukács 1971: 101) In contradistinction to Lukács, 
the reflections on a dynamic analysis of reification, which Castoriadis delineates, grasp it 
as an ever incomplete, contradictory and unpredictable process, which is subjected to and 
definitely shaped by the complex and diverse struggles of the people. As Castoriadis 
argued, 
Reification, the essential tendency of capitalism, can never be wholly realized. If it were, if 
the system were actually able to change individuals into things moved only by economic 
‘forces’, it would collapse not in the long run, but immediately. The struggle of people 
against reification is, just as much as the tendency towards reification, the condition for the 
functioning of capitalism. A factory in which the workers were really and totally mere cogs 
in the machine, blindly executing the orders of management, would come to a stop in a 
quarter of an hour. (Castoriadis, 2005: 16)  
 
For Castoriadis, reification, as a unity of two clashing movements that subsist in a 
continuous struggle, could never be completed. The workers in capitalism are by no 
means fully reduced to things. They are never being entirely reified and utterly alienated. 
Reification could be grasped only as a dynamic process, a constant struggle between 
reification and anti-reification, both elements always coexisting as antagonistic processes. 
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The incomplete reification and the fact that the people in capitalism have been alienated 
go hand in hand with their struggle against this reification, against their reduction into 
objects. Yet this imperfect reification constitutes the driving force and at the same time 
indicates the fragility, the vulnerability and the ultimate contradiction of capitalism. 
Refusal, resistance and struggle against reification compose the ‘remainder’, what is left 
and contradicts the competence of the concept. It is the contradiction which, as Adorno 
put it breaking with Lukács`s ‘wishful image of unbroken subjective immediacy’ 
(Adorno  2003: 374), is ‘nonidentity under the aspect of identity’ (Adorno  2003: 5).  It is 
the ‘distant and different’ (Adorno  2003: 191) that cannot be fully conceptualized or 
according to Horkheimer the ‘chaotic…that which has not been included’ (Adorno and 
Horkheimer 2011: 27). Reification then, for Adorno, is an ‘epiphenomenon’, which 
cannot be resulted from a ‘subjectively errant consciousness, but objectively deduced’ 
arises from what is responsible for the social and economic misery, that is, ‘the 
conditions that condemn mankind to impotence and apathy and would yet be changeable 
by human action’. (Adorno  2003: 190) Rather, as Adorno emphatically stressed, 
Lukács`s analysis ‘hypostatized the indirect as direct’. (Adorno  2003: 374) Whereas for 
Lukács reification appears as a closed category, in which the dynamic elements are 
degraded to a lower level of importance, for Adorno ‘every “is”…contains an…“is 
not”…every identity contains non-identity’ (Adorno 1961: 40) — the ‘unknown …that 
cannot be calculated’. (Adorno 1967a: 66)  
 
Lukács unfolds the theoretical premises of his positions by arguing that the unceasing 
commodification and rationalization of modern life penetrates both the individual and 
society as a whole. Reification is universalized to that extend that mechanization is 
embedded even into the worker`s soul. At the core of this position is the notion that the 
individual is being fragmented and this split in his existence results in ‘the reified, 
mechanically objectified “performance” of the worker, wholly separated from his total 
human personality’. (Lukács 1971: 90) Capitalist production methods treat workers as 
mechanized entities and rationalized tools, who must function and perform in a fully 
instrumental manner. Viewed this way, Lukács asserts with regards to the phenomenon of 
alienation that ‘only when man`s nature is subjugated, deformed and crippled can we 
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speak of an objective societal condition of alienation and, as an inexorable consequence, 
of all the subjective marks of an internal alienation’. (Lukács 1971: xxiv) Adorno in turn 
is concerned with showing that we cannot presuppose that there is not a non-reified 
human essence that becomes alienated by the external thoroughly mechanized and 
rationalized reality, and in which ‘pure’ subject is subjugated and dehumanised. There is 
not a motionless and authentic state of being that precedes reification and 
dehumanisation. As becomes clear, then, for Adorno: 
 
the pat phrase about the “mechanization” of man is deceptive because it thinks of him as 
something static which, through an “influence” from outside, an adaption to conditions of 
production external to him, suffers certain deformations. But there is no substratum beneath 
such ‘deformations’, no ontic interior on which social mechanisms merely act externally: 
the deformation is not a sickness in men but in the society which begets its children with 
the ‘hereditary taint’ that biologism projects on to nature.  (Adorno 2005: 229)  
 
Akin to Adorno`s approach, Castoriadis makes sense of alienation, social heteronomy, as 
a social phenomenon. He takes issues with the ‘purely “psychological” view of 
alienation, the one which seeks the conditions of alienation solely in the structure of 
individuals’, which he deems to be ‘unilateral, abstract and, ultimately, false’. 
(Castoriadis, 2005: 385) Castoriadis attaches great importance to the social dimensions of 
the issue and hence he suggests that ‘the conditions for alienation are to be found in the 
social world’. (Castoriadis, 2005: 108-9)  
 
In Minima Moralia, however, in a manner that could be seen as rather mechanistic and 
quite controversial, Adorno applied Marx`s notion of the ‘organic composition of capital’ 
to individuals living in a capitalist society arguing that the ‘organic composition of man is 
growing’. (Adorno 2005: 229) Extending Marx`s views, Adorno contended that the 
constantly changing rate between the constant and variable capital at the expense of the 
latter, is also reflected within individuals in an analogous fashion: ‘That which 
determines subjects as means of production and not as living purposes, increases with the 
proportion of machines to variable capital’. (Adorno 2005: 229) As a critique of 
conservative investigations on the theme of the crisis of the individuals, Adorno 
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succeeded in putting the accent on the objective social conditions which dominate, 
constitute and transform human beings in capitalism. By conceiving the notion of 
reification and the ongoing alienation of human beings as the outcome of a social 
process, he made an effort to investigate this phenomenon materialistically.  Nonetheless, 
at least at this point, Adorno seems to absolutize the social character of reification and 
overlook the role of subjectivity, as the constitution of the subject appears as a reflection 
of the external conditions. Hence, as Marx would say, ‘he does not grasp the significance 
of “revolutionary”, of practical-critical activity’, and the reified reality is not also 
conceived ‘as human sensuous activity, practice’ (Marx 1991: 28) that is to say, 
subjectively. The objection raised here to Adorno`s approach regarding the ‘rising 
organic composition of man’ (Adorno 2005: 231) concerns his split between subject and 
object, which reproduces a dualist conception of society. Despite his intentions to the 
contrary, capitalist society and human beings are perceived as separate spheres and it is 
regarded that the latter receive rather passively and internalize the external technological 
and social developments. Instead of a dialectical relation between subject and object, a 
one-way causal process is suggested, in which the individual is further reified and adopts 
a passive stance to the external world. As a consequence, a seemingly obvious point that 
is overlooked by Adorno`s analysis, is the active role played by the subject in the 
construction of reality, which is not only exemplified as adaption and docility to reified 
reality, but also, at times,  takes unexpected and unpredictable forms — for example, as 
opposition and resistance against alienation.  
 
On the other hand, and by unravelling the political implications of his theory of 
reification, Castoriadis underscored the active individual and collective reaction against 
this social process of mechanization, at times explicitly organised via unions, strikes and 
revolutions and at times expressed as every day struggles in the workplace taking the 
form and functioning as ‘invisible struggle’. (Castoriadis 1988a:183) Beneath the image 
of reification as frozen reality and capitalism`s continuous endeavour to dehumanize 
people, Castoriadis sees, in a way parallel to Adorno`s ‘social pathogenesis of 
schizophrenia’ or ‘psychotic character’ (Adorno 2005: 230, 231), the social construction 
of a ‘neurotic individual’ (Castoriadis 1988b: 259) and the fundamental contradiction of 
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capitalism. This inherent contradiction of capitalism is encapsulated in the tension and 
conflict between direction and execution within the sphere of production, which seems to 
necessitate, in a rather schizophrenic and contradictory manner, the realization, 
concurrently, of the participation and exclusion of the workers in the production process. 
This contradiction constitutes the vital source that generates the permanent crisis of 
capitalist society. Given this line of analysis and under the influence of Lukas’s 
theoretical elaborations and echoing Weber’s ideas, Castoriadis conceived of this process 
of dehumanisation and depersonalisation as a generalised reification that penetrates not 
only individuals but also social institutions, as well as the political and cultural domain. 
The crisis, thus, becomes all-embracing, as reification extends from the sphere of 
production to the most important facets of contemporary societies. The deployment of 
reification penetrates all aspects of social reality, which is then rendered objectifying for 
the subject. Capitalism’s internal contradiction is extended to cover the totality of social 
relations covering and pervading every aspect of social reality. 
 
As does Lukács, however, Castoriadis equates reification with both alienation and 
fetishism. The analysis of reification appears to conflate the two other concepts to the 
point where they are used interchangeably. In Castoriadis`s analysis of the crisis of 
capitalism, the three terms are fused and in most cases connote the process of 
thingification, objectification and dehumanization. Reification entails the separation 
between subject and object, between capital and labour, whose relation is seen as being 
an external one. Capital is perceived not as social relation, as an internal and antagonistic 
relation between capital and labour. Capital is reified as an independent entity and the 
insubordinate power of labour as internal contradiction within capital is not taken into 
consideration. In this respect, capital is understood as a thing externally opposed to 
labour.  It attacks labour from outside, as a discrete economic mechanism that attempts to 
subjugate and depersonalise workers in the production process. This prompts the reaction 
of the working class, which opposes capital`s aggressive policies. As Castoriadis argued 
‘the system … necessarily engenders opposition, a struggle against it by those upon 
whom it seeks to impose it’. (Castoriadis 1988c: 93)  Given this line of analysis, capital is 
the driving force, which always takes the initiative, makes its own decisions and thus 
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provokes the militancy and class struggle of the labour movement, which in turn generate 
the crises of the capitalist system: ‘the capitalist structure of society consists of 
organizing people’s lives from the outside… and creates a perpetually renewed crisis in 
every sphere of human activity’. (Castoriadis 1988c: 93, 92) Capital shapes and structures 
our social doing from the outside and from a similar viewpoint, that is, from the outside, 
the revolted subjectivity fights against capital`s domination. In this kind of case, for 
Castoriadis, class relations are apprehended as relations of domination rather than 
exploitation. As a result, the limits and contradictions of capital are not grounded in the 
insubordinate power of labour as internal contradiction within capital, but are placed in 
the conflict between directors and executants, between participation and exclusion. Those 
latter contradictions constitute both the driving force and at the same time act as a brake 
on the unfettered development of capitalism owing to the instability and crises they bring 
about.      
 
 
Crisis, Autonomy and Unlimited Expansion of Rational Mastery 
 
Castoriadis broaches the theme of reification again in the third chapter of his The 
Imaginary Institution of Society (1975). Once again, he does not make a distinction 
between reification, alienation and fetishism and he appears to ignore or take no notice of 
Marx`s elaboration of the concept of fetishism put forward in his critique of ‘Trinity 
Formula’ in the third volume of Capital. Castoriadis reiterates his view that the notion of 
reification denotes the dehumanization of the members of the exploited and dominated 
classes. Yet, he supplies an erroneous treatment of the reification as a transhistorical 
category, as he applies the notion equally to both workers in capitalism and slaves living 
in antiquity. Castoriadis develops a rather confusing critique of Marx`s views, by 
suggesting that Marx considers workers`s status under capitalism to be sufficiently low as 
to render them merchandises and by arguing, against Marx, that in the phenomenon of 
reification the worker is reduced neither to a thing nor to a mere commodity. Castoriadis 
tends to forget the fundamental distinction made by Marx between labour and labour 
power. As Fine forcefully reminds us, ‘the juridic significance of Marx`s discovery that 
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workers sell their labour-power and not themselves or their labour was this: it enabled 
him to see that workers […] remain at all times owners of a commodity that is, labour 
power. They are guardians of a commodity rather than being themselves commodities; 
they are in this sense free workers rather than slaves’. (Fine 1984: 119) Conversely, 
Castoriadis stresses the point made in his earlier texts pertaining to the ‘relativity of the 
concept of reification’, by pointing out that ‘it is the struggle of slaves or of workers 
which questions reification and relativizes it as a category and as a reality’. (Castoriadis 
2005: 391) He continues to grasp reification as a dynamic concept and underscores the 
crucial role of the class struggle. He also persists in comprehending capital and the 
process of reification as an analysis of domination. This approach was a corollary of his 
gradual break with Marxism and mirrors his critique of the Marxian theorizing. His 
critique of what he considered to be Marx`s rationalism, positivism and economism went 
parallel with his decision to move beyond ‘beyond “class thinking” ’. (Castoriadis 1992: 
224) Concurrently, the focal point of his theory shifts to the unfolding of the notion of 
‘social imaginary significations’.  
 
 Castoriadis`s interpretation of the social character of the USSR or China best exemplifies 
the nub of his criticism of Marxism and his development of the concept of ‘social 
imaginary significations’. His approach, articulated through Weberian lenses, was based 
on the assumption that the increasing rationalisation and bureaucratization of modern 
social and economic life cannot be explicated with an analysis of production and the 
economy. The increasing vital role played by institutions of state and bureaucracy and the 
occurrence of common sociocultural forms, such as the social imaginary significations, 
have led both western and east European regimes to converge. These developments gave 
rise to a new social system which Castoriadis names ‘bureaucratic capitalism’. This novel 
social formation consists of two variants, that is, ‘total bureaucratic capitalism’ in the 
USSR and the ‘fragmented bureaucratic capitalism’ in western societies. What both types 
of bureaucratic capitalism have in common is that they belong to the same social-
historical universe. Their distinctive characteristic is not that they are ruled by capital, but 
that they are dominated and penetrated by similar ‘social imaginary significations’, such 
as the central role of economy, the emphasis placed on technology and organization in 
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the production process or the obsession with development, progress and quantitative 
growth. The intersection and connection of all these social imaginary significations is 
realized through the imaginary signification of ‘rational’ mastery which subsists both in 
Marxian problematic and the capitalist universe. The specificity of these significations 
lies in the fact that they are ‘relatively independent of the signifiers that carry them and 
that they play a role in the choice and in the organization of these signifiers. These 
significations can correspond to the perceived, to the rational or to the imaginary’. 
(Castoriadis 2005: 139) Through this new prism, reification is seen as an ‘operative 
signification’ and defined as an ‘imaginary meaning’. (Castoriadis 2005: 140) Castoriadis 
views reification as profoundly determined by institutions, under which he also subsumes 
the production relations. Equally, reification is operative in its function and it bears 
considerable social and historical implications as it, in turn, coordinates human action and 
manages social relations. What Marx failed to grasp, according to Castoriadis, is that in 
each society there is a central imaginary, which is not only indissoluble from the 
constitution of actual social contradictions, but is also ‘at the root of alienation as well as 
of creation in history’. (Castoriadis 2005: 133)  
 
In one of Castoriadis`s first attempts to explicate and elucidate the concept of imaginary, 
he turns to Marx, and quotes as follows from the section on ‘fetishism’ in Capital, Vol I:   
‘…a definite social relation between men…assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a 
relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to 
the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the 
human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation 
both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the 
products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of 
labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities…’ (Castoriadis 2005: 389)   
 
Discussing the aforementioned quote, Castoriadis remarks that Marx ‘obviously went 
beyond purely economic view and recognized the role of the imaginary’. (Castoriadis 
2005: 132) This assumption enabled him to criticize Marx`s for assigning a limited 
significance to the social function of the imaginary, which derived from the insufficient 
development of technology. In other words, imaginary formations emanated from 
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society’s inability to resolve its own contradictions. Yet, at this point, Castoriadis appears 
to perform an absolute misreading of Marx`s words and intentions. Evidently, if one 
conceives of Marx`s analysis of fetishism as his effort to move beyond economic 
interpretations and explicate the origins of society’s imaginary constructions, such as God 
and religion, then Castoriadis rightly criticizes him for an inadequate and restricted 
undertaking. Taking them at face value, Marx`s observations pertaining the genesis and 
reproduction of religious consciousness has little merit, and one could argue that they are 
rather naïve, over-simplistic, problematic and uncritical.  
 
In contradistinction to Castoriadis’s approach, however, one could argue that Marx 
employs the example of the religious world as an ‘analogy’ in order to explain and 
criticize the ‘doubling’ of the world, which leads to a double life, a life in heaven (of 
religion, philosophy, law, state, economic forms and abstractions) and a life on earth 
(society, social relations, human practice). The key issue, then, is not to define, explain 
God or the role of the imaginary, but to criticize this ‘twofold existence’, this ‘enchanted, 
perverted, topsy-turvy world’ (Marx 1984: 830) so as to demystify and decipher it on a 
human basis. For Marx, there is only one world created by human social practice. Marx 
did seek to go beyond ‘purely economic view’, as Castoriadis claims, aiming to replace 
or complement his analysis with the investigation of other ideological, psychological or 
cultural forms. Marx sought to provide a critique of political economy, which, amongst 
other things, amounts primarily to a critique of fetishism. In capitalism, according to 
Marx, human beings are enslaved in their own creation. They are enslaved and get lost in 
what they have created and produced. Their life-practice takes the shape of various 
perverted forms. Human practice, as the essence of things, is the basis of social 
constitution, but it is concealed in these inverted and distorted forms, and it needs to be 
de-mystified. The creators are dominated by their creation and governed by abstractions, 
by abstract economic forces and laws. Human social relations exist in the forms of 
money, state, capital or law; they are constitutive of these forms and yet they look as if 
they are ruled by them. It seems that poverty, inequalities and misery derive from 
something beyond human control. It occurs that we are governed by coins, economic 
products and abstract financial markets. Those who constitute appear suddenly as 
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derivatives of an inverted world. Marx`s wants to reveal the content, the essence, the 
human relations which are hidden in this ‘topsy-turvy world’. He criticized economic 
categories with the purpose of deciphering their social constitution. Marx`s attempt rests 
on the comprehension of social practice that creates the abstract and imaginary worlds, 
and at the same time, on the understanding of how the phantasmagoria of social relations 
between things constitutes human social relations. As Tomba has vehemently point out, 
The phantasmagoria constitutes the negative of modern rationality: not its negation, but its 
trace. The Cartesian project of the foundation of rationality on the certainty of the ego 
cogito is placed in check. In the phantasmagoria, the senses ‘deceive us’ in an objective 
way; equally objectively, ‘waking can never be distinguished from sleep’. Marx emphasizes 
how the effect of fetishism is not simply illusory, but objective. The phantasmagoria puts us 
in an inverted world of spells and spectres. Marx does not propose an Enlightenment-style 
critique. He does not intend to deny the existence of monsters, but to demonstrate how real 
monsters really produce a monstrous imaginary. Hence, the project of Capital announces in 
the ‘Preface’ of 1867: ‘we have to remove the “magic cap” that we draw down over our 
eyes and ears as a make-believe that there are no monsters’. (Tomba 2013: 94-5) 
 
Marx`s critique aimed to demonstrate the human content of these monstrous imaginaries, 
to decipher them on a human basis. He envisages a society of the free and equals, in 
which rational organization and collective self-management will make economic laws 
and abstractions that now come across as being independent and inexorable, disappear. 
Marx`s social critique, then, asks to bring to the fore the social constitution of the 
inverted world of capitalist forms. As he put it, ‘‘all emancipation is reduction of the 
human world and of relations to man himself’’. (Marx, 1992: 234) On the contrary, in 
Castoriadis’s approach the real, the social constitution of the world is not questioned, but 
it is doubled. In one of the preparatory drafts, which was written before the publication of 
The Imaginary Institution of Society, Castoriadis attempted to elucidate the meaning he 
attached to the concept of the imaginary: 
We can grasp the imaginary as soon as we ask a basic question: what are the most general 
conditions for the existence of an individual subject or a collectivity of subjects? These 
conditions can be summed up in two points: there is a given reality that is a resistant ground 
(sol), coherent and inexhaustible; and a given other of reality, not a (real) negation of the 
real, but an a-reality. The latter springs from and is supported by the essential characteristic 
of subjects, that is their ability to ignore the real, to detach themselves from it, to put it at a 
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distance; and thus to take a view that differs from the seemingly straightforward one, to add 
to reality an unreal extension, to think of something else, to represent and do what is not 
given, and to make the possible exist. This essential characteristic, constitutive of human 
existence, is what I call the imaginary (or the imagination, when the emphasis is on the 
corresponding activity). (Castoriadis 2015: 60)  
 
For Castoriadis, society is split into two parts, two worlds: a) the given reality and b) an 
a-reality. The latter, which Castoriadis calls ‘imaginary’ or ‘imagination’, exists 
independently of the human subjects and although it emanates from them, it constitutes 
their social existence and the modes of their subsistence. Whereas Marx, as Tomba put it, 
‘did not move towards the heavens of abstraction, but towards the materiality of acting 
and suffering bodies’, (Tomba 2013: 92) Castoriadis turned to spiritualism, by seeing 
heaven instead of earth. The changing complex of social relationships torn by class 
antagonisms are replaced with ‘individual subjects or a collectivity of subjects’ and social 
imaginary significations become the motive forces of history. Society remains divided 
not into antagonistic social classes, but is split between reality and a-reality, real life and 
the imagination. Castoriadis’s individual subjects are detached from the relations of 
production. His break with Marxism was rooted in his rejection of economic 
reductionism. Now he too reduces the human relations and the genesis of social 
phenomena to one essential function: that of the imaginary. The contradictory 
constitution of social relations is overlooked and the connection with the conditions of 
social reproduction is broken. Departing from a concrete analysis of the contradictions 
rooted in production and social relations, Castoriadis replaces actual history, conflicts and 
struggles with the history of social imaginary significations. This time the antagonism 
between labour and capital or between directors and executants is restored and 
substantiated into the struggle between autonomy and capitalist rationalization.  
 
Castoriadis unfolds his own scheme of explication the evolution of modernity as well as 
the contradictions and the roots of capitalist crises. The alternative he puts forward is the 
periodization of modernity, and mainly the Western European history, which is based on 
the specificity of the imaginary signification of ‘autonomy’, its emergence and eclipse, as 
well as its conflict with a new social imaginary signification, that is, the unlimited 
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expansion of ‘rational mastery’. On the basis of these two central social imaginaries, 
which appear to come into conflict as two externally constituted entities of a heavenly 
world, Castoriadis constructed a course of events or rather a canonization of history. 
Thus, he divided European history into fundamentally three distinct periods, which are 
derivative of the two social imaginaries: a) The first period is extended from the twelfth 
to the early eighteenth century and is characterized by the constitution of the West and 
the re-emergence (after its genesis in the ancient Greek democracy) of the idea of 
autonomy. b) The second phase, from 1800 to 1950, witnessed the emergence and 
creation of capitalism, which ‘embodies a new social imaginary signification: the 
unlimited expansion of “rational mastery”’. (Castoriadis 1997: 36) Throughout this 
historical stage, the conflict between the two imaginary significations, that is to say, the 
struggle between autonomy and unlimited expansion of “rational mastery”, defined the 
character of the socio-economic reality and constituted the driving force of the 
extraordinary growth and advance of Western societies. (Castoriadis 1997: 39) c) Finally, 
the third period, which starts from 1950, is the epoch of a generalized conformism. The 
social and political conflicts disappeared and more precisely, after the ‘semifailures’ of 
the `60`s social movements ‘the project of autonomy seems totally eclipsed’. (Castoriadis 
1997: 39) According to Castoriadis`s periodization of modernity, then, history is 
systematized and structured in line with the adventures of the project of autonomy, its 
successive emergence and eclipse, and its antagonism with the imaginary of ‘rational 
mastery’. Modernity is subjected to a unified approach and is instituted on a dualistic 
scheme, which tries to comprehend the specificity of Western European history from the 
twelfth century to the present day and its own particular crises. On this criterion, 
Castoriadis opined that, from 1950 onwards, a date which Castoriadis himself admits is 
‘evidently arbitrary’ (Castoriadis 2003a: 83), the Western world entered into a period of 
permanent crisis. What is particularly noteworthy is his viewing of the profound crisis of 
modern capitalist societies as an on-going and long-lasting social phenomenon, which has 
begun to express itself in new forms of barbarism. Hence, it has taken on all the 
characteristics of decline and decadence. Generalized conformism is increasingly being 
transformed into generalised decomposition. 
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From Crisis to Decline to Insignificancy 
 
The central importance that Castoriadis’s interpretation of the phenomenon of crisis holds 
in his theoretical production is also signaled in the last stage of his intellectual itinerary. 
Lukács, in one of his last interviews in 1970, maintained with reference to the crisis of 
capitalism that the ‘whole system is facing the initial stages of an extraordinarily 
profound crisis’ and made it explicit that ‘we are at the threshold of a world crisis. The 
threshold can, of course, mean 50 years’. (Lukács 1970: 44) Castoriadis, on the other 
hand, insisted in his argument that since 1950 the ‘Western World has entered into crisis, 
and this crisis consists precisely in this, that the West ceases to call itself truly into 
question’. (Castoriadis 2003a: 83) Castoriadis’s proposition posits a strong connection 
between crisis, critique and the inability to offer a radical alternative to crisis. From his 
perspective ‘the crisis of criticism is only one of the manifestations of the general and 
deep-seated crisis of society’. (Castoriadis 2003b: 130) The regression even of the 
traditional functions of critique, as it was used to manifest itself in the press or academia, 
has undermined the foundations of the Western liberal model. This lack of substantial 
critique, self-reflection and self-criticism has extended generalized conformism, 
depoliticization and apathy to cover the totality of social life in modern societies. 
Immaturity, in Kant`s understanding of the term, has become a generalised phenomenon 
penetrating and prevailing even in the traditional opposites of the capitalist system, that 
is, the Left and the organized labour movement. The dynamic elements that critique as 
critical-practical activity used to contribute for the rejuvenation of the static conditions of 
society have been downplayed and nearly diminished. This loss of the critical function, of 
negative and destructive critique, has produced, as Adorno put it, the ‘symptoms of 
paralysis which precede the ruin of the static order’. (Adorno  1961: 36) Castoriadis 
associates these symptoms of decadence with the mystification of the alternatives and the 
role played by the private mass media and ‘the vacuum industry’ (Castoriadis 2003c: 2-
13).  He interprets these signs of decay as a result of society’s failure to produce an 
alternative to capitalism project, a new radical undertaking that puts forward the direction 
toward which we are heading. In this sense, modern society is in crisis, according to 
Castoriadis, because ‘it is not capable of engendering another way for people to be 
together’. (Castoriadis 2003d: 224)  
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In his later theoretical development, Castoriadis placed much more emphasis on the 
social, human, political and cultural character of the crisis, building upon ideas he had 
first sketched out in his earlier writings. In his article Recommencing the Revolution, for 
instance, he argued that the analyses of the crisis of capitalist production in conjunction 
with the crisis of the political organizations and institutions ‘must be complemented by 
an analysis of the crisis in values and in social life as such, und ultimately by an analysis 
of the crisis in the very personality of modern man’. (Castoriadis 1993b: 40) Following 
this line of inquiry, he views the eruption of economic and financial crises as merely 
symptoms of a much deeper and profound crisis, which is related to the process of a 
generalised decomposition and decline of capitalist societies. This decay is evident as a 
crisis of social and human values or as a crisis in the meaning of life and of human 
motives, which have led to the emptiness and poverty of everyday life. Castoriadis 
attributes the pervasive corrosion of values and morals, as well as the dislocation of 
human social relations and collective ways of life, to a ‘void of signification’. In other 
words, crisis becomes visible as a crisis of the significations and meanings that used to 
hold modern societies together. People retreated into their private sphere, feeling 
powerless to collectively control, organize and direct their lives. The abstract forces of 
the financial market and the rule of money prevail and their function takes the form of 
inexorable laws, which stand above society and becomes uncontrollable. The crisis of 
socialization and the disappearance of responsibility and liability are coupled with 
prevailing values, which are those of market-driven neo-liberal ideology: individualism, 
competition, efficiency, flexibility, consumption and money. This process addresses 
significant issues concerning the meaning of human existence and creates a new type of 
human, who has great difficulties in filling the content of their life with positive 
motivations. As Castoriadis emphatically put it, referring to the modern individual, ‘he 
runs, he jogs, he shops in supermarkets, he goes channel surfing’, but ‘nothing he does 
[…] has the slightest meaning’. (Castoriadis 2003d: 228) 
 
Social disarticulation finds its expression in the crisis of culture and the disintegration of 
modern individual. From Castoriadis`s vantage point, the rising tide of insignificancy, 
which has shaped the character of modern western societies, has led to the emergence of 
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a new ‘anthropological type’. This new human type contradicts the Protestant work ethic 
and its call to self-discipline, as well as the traditional anthropological types, which 
constitute an indispensable element for the smooth operation and reproduction of 
capitalist society: the ‘Schumpeter-style entrepreneur’ as well as ‘incorruptible judges, 
honest Weberian-style civil servants, teachers devoted to their vocation, workers with at 
least a minimum of conscientiousness about their work, and so on’. (Castoriadis 2003a: 
88) Castoriadis has categorically correlated the ‘anthropological type’ or the 
‘anthropological question’ with the social conditions they have sprung from. Nonetheless, 
the issue at stake here is that due to his reference to cultural elements and the impact of 
the social imaginaries, his analysis to be perceived as a critique of the cultural 
underpinning of modern societies that leaves untouched — and hypostasizes — the 
capitalist social relations as something natural and eternal. On this, Habermas (Habermas 
1996: 42) reminds us that neoconservatism contends that modernist culture has come to 
erode the norms and values of the Protestant ethic, by instilling in modern individuals 
principles and doctrines that are incompatible with the demands of professional life in 
modern societies. Habermas gives the example here of Daniel Bell, who sought to 
account for the critical split between culture and society in advanced Western societies, 
calling for a return to traditional and religious values in order for the decay of the 
individual to be transcended.  
 
From a more radical vantage point, Adorno made a significant point, which is directly 
opposed to conservative analyses. He wrote, ‘reactionary criticism often enough attains 
insight into the decay of individuality and the crisis of society, but places the ontological 
responsibility for this on the individual as such, as something discrete and internal: for 
this reason the accusation of shallowness, lack of faith and substance, is the last word it 
has to say, and return to the past its solace’. (Adorno 2005: 148) Seen through Adorno`s 
prism, then, Castoriadis`s views concerning the rising tide of insignificancy, emptiness 
and superficiality must not been grasped as an ahistorical critical explanation of late 
modernity. If ‘insignificancy’ is detached from contradictory and antagonistic social 
relations, then it runs the risk of becoming fetishized as an invariant catchwork and a new 
embellishment of capitalism`s decline. In this sense, ‘insignificancy’ fails to reflect 
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capitalism`s transition away from its classical liberal classical form, which Castoriadis`s 
immanent critique attempted to demonstrate. It acts as an abstract form, which pictures 
one aspect of the decay, but it is unable to explore its origins. Overestimating the 
importance of the concept of ‘insignificancy’ and applying it mechanistically entails 
‘accept[ing] symptoms uncritically’. (Adorno 1967b: 47)  
 
In an exchange with Christopher Lasch concerning ‘The Culture of Narcissism’, 
Castoriadis revisited the same claim — that since the end of the 1950s people had begun 
retreating into their private sphere. Life came to connote a struggle for survival. The 
expression ‘one day at a time’ captures not only the lack of an individual and social 
project, but also signifies that the time horizon has been transformed into a private one: 
‘Nobody participates in a public time horizon’. (Castoriadis 2011b: 69) This has been 
also made evident at the political level. Insignificancy, cynicism, social and political 
apathy, corruption and bureaucracy were coupled with the people’s acceptance of the 
movement towards privatization. The division between Left and Right has been blurred 
and politics has become ‘practically indistinguishable from any other form of advertising 
or sale of products’. (Castoriadis 1993c: 111) ‘These are absurd times’ Castoriadis 
comments and concludes: ‘We`re living in bad times, that`s all’. (Castoriadis 2010: 131, 
134) According to Agnoli, ‘the true characterization of ‘liberal democracy’ is … 
constitutional oligarchy’. (Agnoli 2000: 201)  Castoriadis resorts to a similar observation. 
He considers modern Western neo-liberal societies as ‘Liberal Oligarchies’ (Castoriadis 
2003a: 78), which especially after the collapse of the left-ideologies, are experiencing an 
‘ideological aberration’, which ‘is itself an important sign of the crisis. There is no new 
subversive or revolutionary discourse, but there is no conservative discourse either’. 
(Castoriadis 2003d: 225)  
 
However important, although under-acknowledged, Castoriadis`s study of the crises and 
contradictions of modern capitalist societies is, he exposes himself to the same charge he 
makes against orthodox Marxism. At times, he examines the economic, social, political, 
ideological and cultural dimensions of crisis as isolated phenomena. In his attempt to 
depart his approach from the economism of the Marxist perspective, he neglects the fact 
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that all these expressions of the crisis must be examined as a whole,  as different aspects 
of capitalist social relations. Class and productive relations, the relation between capital 
and labour, express themselves through various forms and appear as discrete symptoms-
phenomena of the crisis. It is hard to avoid a reductionist approach, if these different 
manifestations of the crisis are examined independently and in isolation from one 
another, as seen in some of Castoriadis’s writings. Thus, these phenomena constitute a 
contradictory unity, run into one another and meet as inter-connected fragments of one 
unified process, may it be crisis, decline or barbarism. That said, in his analysis of crisis, 
Castoriadis does not exclude the historical possibility of a regression to barbarism. Nor 
loses sights he of the possibility of human emancipation through the unfolding of the 
project of social autonomy. As Curtis vehemently underscores, the theme ‘Socialism or 
Barbarism’ constitutes an ‘important yet neglected aspect’ of Castoriadis`s work. 
Unfortunately, however, ‘critics have neglected this alternative, and its neglect has 
impaired the understanding of the meaning, import and direction of his work’. (Curtis 
1989: 293) What is distinctive in Castoriadis`s writing, as Curtis has argued, pertains to 
his contention that barbarism is viewed ‘as a present negativity tied to the prospects of 
socialism. Whereas Trotsky pushed the prospect of barbarism into the future, making it a 
soon-to-be-present negativity (or a possibility whose time would pass), Castoriadis 
insisted that “barbarism is not a historical stage suddenly appearing after the capitalist 
system has reached its point of impasse. It already makes its appearance in decaying 
capitalism too.” ’ (Curtis 1989: 300) Castoriadis`s discussion of the dialectics between 
barbarism and socialism is important for at least two reasons. The ongoing crisis of 
capitalist societies and its final outcome is ambivalent, as much as the man-made 
historical possibilities are open and unpredictable on both sides. Finally, the option of 
slipping into new forms of barbarism coexists with the prospect of human emancipation. 
Adorno makes this point well: ‘In a world of brutal and oppressed life, decadence 
becomes the refuge of a potentially better life…What can oppose the decline of the west 
is not a resurrected culture but the utopia that is silently contained in the image of its 
decline’. (Adorno 1967a: 72)  
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NOTES 
                                                 
1As Castoriadis put it: ‘To work and to struggle is the only thing we can do to keep a 
project of emancipation, of liberation, alive’. (Castoriadis 1995: 33):Also see in one of 
his interviews in 1991 and in his answer to the question of what the role of the 
intellectual should be, Castoriadis clarified his approach, with eloquent precision, thus: 
‘Uncompromising criticism of existing realities and elucidation of the possibilities for 
transforming them’. (Castoriadis, 2011a: 108)  
 
2 Despite contrary interpretations, Castoriadis summarizes his relationship with Marx 
succinctly in the following: ‘Looking back, my fundamental political orientation is 
without doubt rooted in the work and engagement of Marx’ […] ‘The concern to combine 
understanding with a project of change I have learned from Marx, or invented, I don’t 
know which. In this sense there is a bond between Marx and me. I privilege Marx over 
the other great thinkers because he tries again to be a philosophical citizen and citizen-
philosopher’. (Castoriadis 1995: 31)  
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adorno, T. (1961) ‘ “Static” and “Dynamic” as sociological Categories’, Diogenes, 9: 28-
49. 
 
Adorno, T. (1967a) ‘Spengler After the Decline’, in Adorno, T. (1967) Prisms 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press). 
 
Adorno, T. (1967b) ‘The Sociology of Knowledge and its Consciousness’, in Adorno, T. 
(1967) Prisms (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press). 
 
Adorno, T. (2003) Negative Dialectics (London: Continuum). 
Adorno, T. (2005) Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life (London: Verso) 
Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, M. (2011) Towards A New Manifesto (London: Verso) 
 
Agnoli,J. (2000) ‘The Market, the State, and the End of History’, in Bonefeld, W. and 
Psychopedis, K. (ed.) The Politics of Change: Globalization, Ideology and Critique 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
24 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Castoriadis, C. (1988a) ‘On the Content of Socialism, III’ in D. A. Curtis (ed.) Cornelius 
Castoriadis, Political and Social Writings, Vol. 2, 1955-1960: From the Workers` 
Struggle Against Bureaucracy to Revolution in the Age of Modern Capitalism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). 
 
Castoriadis, C. (1988b) ‘Modern Capitalism and Revolution’ in D. A. Curtis (ed.) 
Cornelius Castoriadis: Political and Social Writings, Vol. 2, 1955-1960: From the 
Workers` Struggle Against Bureaucracy to Revolution in the Age of Modern Capitalism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). 
 
Castoriadis, C. (1988c) ‘On the Content of Socialism, II’, in D. A. Curtis (ed.) Cornelius 
Castoriadis: Political and Social Writings, Vol. 2, 1955-1960: From the Workers` 
Struggle Against Bureaucracy to Revolution in the Age of Modern Capitalism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). 
 
Castoriadis, C. (1992) ‘The Crisis of Marxism, The Crisis of Politics’, Dissent, Spring: 
221-225. 
 
Castoriadis, C. (1993a) ‘The Diversionists’ in D. A. Curtis (ed.) Cornelius Castoriadis: 
Political and Social Writings, Vol. 3, 1961-1979: Recommmencing the Revolution: From 
Socialism to Autonomous Society (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). 
 
Castoriadis, C. (1993b) ‘Recommencing the Revolution’ in D. A. Curtis (ed.) Cornelius 
Castoriadis, Political and Social Writings, Vol. 3, 1961-1979: Recommencing the 
Revolution: From Socialism to Autonomous Society (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press).  
 
Castoriadis, C. (1993c) ‘The Crisis of Modern Society’ in D. A. Curtis (ed.) Cornelius 
Castoriadis, Political and Social Writings, Vol. 3, 1961-1979: Recommencing the 
Revolution: From Socialism to Autonomous Society (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press).  
 
Castoriadis, C. (1995) ‘Cornelius Castoriadis’ in Rötzer, F. Conversations with French 
philosophers (New Jersey: Humanities Press). 
 
Castoriadis, C. (1997) ‘The Retreat from Autonomy: Postmodernism as Generalized 
Conformism’ in D. A. Curtis (ed.) World in Fragments (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press). 
 
25 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Castoriadis, C. (2003a) ‘The Dilapidation of the West’, in C. Castoriadis The Rising Tide 
of Insignificancy (The Big Sleep). Translated from the French and edited anonymously as 
a public service. Available at http://www.costis.org/x/castoriadis/Castoriadis-
rising_tide.pdf 
 
Castoriadis, C. (2003b) ‘The Rising Tide of Insignificancy’ in C. Castoriadis The Rising 
Tide of Insignificancy (The Big Sleep). 
 
Castoriadis, C. (2003c) ‘The Vacuum Industry’ in C. Castoriadis The Rising Tide of 
Insignificancy (The Big Sleep). 
 
Castoriadis, C. (2003d) ‘The Crisis of the Identification Process’ in C. Castoriadis, The 
Rising Tide of Insignificancy (The Big Sleep). 
 
Castoriadis, C. (2005) The Imaginary Institution of Society (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
Castoriadis, C. (2010) ‘These are Bad Times’ in Escobar, E.  Gondicas, M. and Vernay, 
P. (ed.) A Society Adrift: Interviews and Debates, 1974-1997 (New York: Fordham 
University Press). 
 
Castoriadis, C. (2011a) ‘The Crisis of the Imaginary?’ in C. Castoriadis Postscript on 
Insignificancy. Translated from the French and edited anonymously as a public service. 
Available at http://www.notbored.org/PSRTI.pdf 
 
Castoriadis, C. and Lasch, C. (2011b) ‘Beating the retreat into Private Life’ in C. 
Castoriadis Postscript on Insignificancy.  
 
Castoriadis, C. (2015) ‘The Imaginary as Such’, Social Imaginaries, Vol. 1, Issue 1: 59-
69. 
 
Curtis, D. A. (1989) ‘Socialism or Barbarism: The alternative presented in the work of 
Cornelius Castoriadis’, in G .Busino (ed.) Autonomie et autotransformation de la société. 
La philosophie militante de Cornelius Castoriadis (Geneva : Droz). 
 
Fine, B. (1984) Democracy and the Rule of Law: Marx`s Critique of the Legal Form 
(New Jersey: The Blackburn Press) 
 
26 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Habermas, J. (1996) ‘Modernity: An Unfinished Project’, in d`Entrèves, M.P. and 
Benhabib, S. (ed.) Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity (Cambridge: 
Polity Press). 
 
Horkheimer, H. (1972) ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, in Horkheimer, M Critical 
Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Herder and Herder).  
 
Kosik, K. (1976) Dialectics of the Concrete (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company). 
 
Lukács, G. (1970) ‘The Twin Crises’ New Left Review 60: 36–47. 
 
Lukács, G. (1971) History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin Press). 
 
Marx, K. (1984) Capital, Volume III (London: Lawrence and Wishart). 
 
Marx, K. (1991) ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, in Marx, K. and Engels, F. Selected Works 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart). 
 
Marx, K. (1992) On the Jewish Question, in Marx, K. Early Writings (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin) 
 
Tomba, M. (2013) Marx`s Temporalities (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books) 
 
 
 
 
 
